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ABSTRACT 
The One Box One W ire (OB1) Joint Com bined Technology De monstration 
(JCTD) is a  United Sta tes Centra l Comm and (USCENTCOM) initia tive that has been 
approved b y congress for a FY 2009 rolling  st art.  The prim ary goal of the JCTD 
Program is to dem onstrate, operationally assess, and trans ition capability solutions and 
innovative concepts to address the joint, co alition and interagency operational gaps and 
shortfalls in meeting the needs of the warf ighter.  Since inception in 1995, the Advanced 
Concept Technology Dem onstration (ACTD) Program, a nd now the Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program, has deployed critically needed warfighting 
solutions to every major Combatant Command theater. 
The OB1 JCTD is an initiativ e designed to transform the existing Departm ent of 
Defense (DoD) air-gapped networks (NIPR, SIPR, etc.) to an environment that allows the 
user to access all networks from a single PC terminal while still preserving the separation 
and security of data flows.   
This thes is will be a b usiness c ase analys is of  the cos t of  im plementing and  
sustaining the OB1 JCTD as com pared to th e current DoD m ulti-network infrastructure.  
This thesis will address  the question of whether converting the existing military network 
infrastructure into OB1 is f inancially feasible. This thesis will concentrate specifically on 
OB JCTD initiative.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The One Box One W ire (OB1) Joint Com bined Technology De monstration 
(JCTD) is a  United Sta tes Centra l Comm and (USCENTCOM) initia tive that has been 
approved b y congress for a FY 2009 rolling  st art.  The prim ary goal of the JCTD 
Program is to dem onstrate, operationally assess, rapidly deploy, and tran sition capability 
solutions and innovative concepts to addres s the joint, coalit ion and interagency 
operational gaps and shortfalls.  Since inception in 1995, the Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program , and now the Joint Capability Technology 
Demonstration (JCTD) Program , has deployed critically needed  warfighting solutions to 
every major Combatant Command theater. 
Rolling starts have been successfully ve tted through the JC TD process however; 
there still remains a product development or resource management issue that needs to be  
resolved with the stakeholders prior to project initiation 
The OB1 JCTD is an initiativ e designed to transform the existing Departm ent of 
Defense (DoD) air-gapped networks (NIP R, SIPR,  J WICS, CENT RIX) to an 
environment that allows the user to access al l networks from a single PC term inal while 
still preserving the separation and security of  data f lows.  The inef fectiveness of  air-
gapped networks results in danger ous challenges to succe ssful multinational operations 
with increasing cost to life and high risk to mission failure.  
This thes is will be a b usiness c ase analys is of  the cos t of  im plementing and  
sustaining the OB1 JCTD as com pared to th e current DoD m ulti-network infrastructure.  
In order to m eet that objective it will a ddress the questio n of whether converting  the 
existing m ilitary networ k (NIPR, SIPR, JW ICS, MCFI, CENTRIX, etc.) inf rastructure 
into OB1 is f inancially f easible. Th is thesis will concentrate specif ically on OB JCTD 
initiative. 
Specific res earch ques tions include: the cost of im plementing OB1, to include, 
research and development (R&D) and procurem ent, the sa vings of OB1 verses current 
infrastructure, and in what infrastructure will OB1 be implemented. 
The results of the OB1 business case analysis are as follows: 
 xiv
 OB1 has a NPV Savings of $263.1M 
 OB1 has a ROI of 662.9% 
 Positive sa vings and ROI are realiz ed f rom the f irst year of  OB1  
implementation 
 The base case annualized ROI never falls below 275.6% when the 
discount factor was varied from 3% to 10% 
 The base case annualized ROI does not  fall below 683.4%, even when the 
initial investment cost to field OB1 is increased by $20.0M 
 The base case annualized ROI does not fall below 231.7%, even when 
varying the recurring investment costs from 0% to 1000% 
 Given a worst-case scenario for OB1:  
o OB1 still yields a ROI of 49.9% 
 The analysis conducted in this thesis  shows that financially, OB1 is a 
viable and robust solu tion to the pr oblem of having m ultiple air gapped 
networks. OB1 provides a high return on investment over a wide range of  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The One Box One W ire (OB1) Joint Com bined Technology De monstration 
(JCTD) was born at the United States Ce ntral Command (USCENTCOM) MacDill Air 
Force Base in Tam pa, Florida. It was he re that CENTCOM ’s Science and Technology 
Advisor discovered there was a problem . He observed that m any desks were cluttered 
with m ultiple personal com puters, monitors  an d m iles of cabling. Not only that, even 
though CENTCOM  buildings were relatively new, there was a trem endous a mount of  
extra cooling capacity required to cool all this equipment. There was a call put out to the 
scientific co mmunity and the Mu ltiple Ind ependent Leve ls of  Security  (MILS)  Gr oup 
responded. Eventually, they went to CENTCO M and briefed them  on MILS technology 
that was currently available. Som e of thes e technologies were be ing used in the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF ), the F -22 Raptor and the Join t Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 
programs. It is the em bedded software in these programs that provide a separation kernel 
which allo ws m ultiple indepen dent lev els of  security (TOP SECRET to  
UNCLASSIFIED) in the aircraft on-board computer. CENTCOM inquired if the software 
could be used in a Local Area Networ k (LAN) environm ent and in August 2007, two 
commercial vendors, Green Hills Software (GHS), and Objectiv e Interface Solutions 
(OIS), responded with a proposal that would solve their problem. The pri mary 
components of which include the IN TEGRITY® secure operating system and separation 
kernel by G HS, a Black Channel gigabit swit ch and a Black Channel network interface  
card (NIC) provided by OIS. 
The OB1 JCTD is a USCENTCOM  initiative that has been a pproved by congress 
for a FY 2009 rolling start.  According to the FY 2009 JCTD (2008), the primary goal of 
the JCTD Program is to dem onstrate, operationally assess, rapidly deploy, and transition 
capability s olutions an d innovativ e concepts  to addres s the join t, coalition  and  
interagency operational gaps and shortfalls .  Since inception in 1995, the Advanced 
Concept Technology Dem onstration (ACTD) Program, a nd now the Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program, has deployed critically needed warfighting 
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solutions to  every m ajor Com batant Command theater. Rolling s tarts have b een 
successfully vetted through th e JCTD process; however, th ere still rem ains a product 
development or resource m anagement issue that need s to b e re solved with  the 
stakeholders prior to project initiation.  
The FY 2009 JCTD Congressional Notification (2008) states: 
By design, the JCTD p rogram is n ot an acquisition  prog ram, but it is 
intended to  jum p-start the acquisition  proc ess th rough succes sful, 
innovative demonstrations of m ature technology…The JCTD program  is  
integrated with the Jo int Capability Integr ation and Develo pment System 
(JCIDS) developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS). The JCTD process 
seeks to  increas e upfront trans ition planning of the concepts and 
technologies demonstrated…The adaptive JCTD process provides an agile 
technology development and dem onstration program to better address the 
threats of an enemy who is not ha mpered by a rigid and m ore deliberative 
budgeting and acquisition process. (p. ii) 
Another major goal of the JCTD program is to have a demonstration of concept in 
two to four years and critical  Combatant Commander (CoCom) capability in two to three 
years with a m ajor focus on tactics, technique s and procedures (TTPs). Often referred to 
as the “80% solution” with a “try with intent to buy” philos ophy the transition and 
acquisition strategy is not fully developed until significant military capability (via testing 
and operational demonstrations) has been veri fied by the CoCom s. The JCTD process is 
also designed to stream line the acquisition process by incorporat ing spiral technology 
insertion and risk mitigation potential (FY 2009 JCTD, 2008, p. iii). 
The purpose of this study is to analy ze the cost savings and benefits of 
implementing the OB1 JCTD. Specifically, this research will: 
 Describe other potential alternative technologies to OB1. This discuss ion will 
also in clude analys is as  to why or why not these altern atives are v iable 
options. 
 Conduct an OB1 JCTD busin ess case analysis, includi ng a baseline analysis 





                                                
B. PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
There are several op erational policies and constr aints in place t oday that inhibit 
information sharing and collaboration univers ally am ongst joint, coalition and inter-
agency warfighters. According to th e OB1 team some of those lim itations are (Network,  
2008, p. 2): 
 Inability to  rapidly sh are, collabo rate on, or synchronize operation al or 
intelligence information between mission partners 
 
 Degraded capability to provide an a ssured environm ent to rapidly access 
relevant, accurate, and timely information 
 
 Limited capability to interoperate with and leverage mission partner systems  
 
 Inability to extend U.S. capabilities  to  mission partners rapidly and within a  
net-centric environment 
 
 Limited res ources to o perate, m aintain, and def end the multiple  se parate 
physical infrastructure/networks required by current policy 
 
 An inability to create a single environm ent that enables the sharing of 
information at tactical through theater levels and within multiple classification 
domains 
 
 Limited access to a co alition networks require creating infor mation on the 
SIPRNET and transferring files via an air gap1 technique   
In their draf t CONOPS the OB1 team states, “These lim itations and constraints 
result in U. S. forces having no cohesive, integrated, effective, efficient, or flexible means 
to seam lessly and quickly shar e critica l in formation with m ission partne rs. This 
ineffectiveness results in dangerous  challenge s to successf ul m ultinational opera tions 




1 An air gap is a security measure often taken for computers and computer networks that have extreme 
security requirements. The architecture must ensure that secure networks are completely physically, 
electrically, and electromagnetically isolated from insecure networks, such as the public Internet or an 
insecure local area network. 
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C. CASE FOR CHANGE 
1. Technical Environment 
Like m ost of  today’ s m ilitary f orces ac ross DoD an d acros s the world 
USCENTCOM has the need for m ultiple networks in order to accomplish its mission. At 
CENTCOM, SIPRNET (SECRET n etwork) and NIPRNET (UNCLASSIFIED network) 
are extremely prolific an d present on  almost every users’ des k. CENTCOM, as well as  
most other Com batant Commands, have a ne ed for coalition networks. Other coalition 
networks include th e CENTRIXS Multin ational Coalition For ces I raq ( MCFI), 
CENTRIX Global Counter Terrorism Forces (GCTF) and bilateral networks.  
The large footprint required for the current DoD network architecture puts a huge 
economic, financial and  logistics bu rden on combatant co mmanders and ultim ately the 
warfighter. The requirem ent to have these networks air gapped and the inability to 
collapse them into a smalle r footprint significantly increases the expense of the network, 
the infrastructure itself and the time to install and maintain.  
2. Operational Environment 
Today’s en emy is elus ive and  res ourceful. T he enem y that our m ilitary faces  
today is  looking less and less lik e the tr aditional enemy of old. Ins tead of  our m ilitary 
engaging in campaigns against well defined nation states with known armies, our military 
is increasingly fighting an enem y that has no state boundaries, no readily apparent army 
and does not fight by traditional rules of war. Our new en emy is increasing ly rad ical, 
elusive and operates without concern for tradi tional nation borders. It is an enem y that 
can rapidly adapt and maneuver; it is very adept at not only mobilizing its own forces, but 
those of the local population, a nd indeed, the global comm unity, as a whole. This enem y 
is increasingly able to em ploy technology at his disposal in a way that can quickly and 
effectively shapes global perceptions in his favor.  
Our enemy is increasing ly winning the In formation Operations (IO) battle. COL 
Ralph O. Baker, former Commanding Officer of the 2d Brigade Com bat Team of the 1 st 
Armored Division in Baghdad, expressed his frust ration with his superior’s inability t o 
get his units version of events out to the media before the enemy in an article he wrote for 
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Military Times in May 2006. According to COL Baker (2006), “While precious time was 
being spen t ‘gath ering f acts’, the e nemy wa s busily explo iting to the ir advan tage the  
ensuing chaos. The m essage they passed to th e press was th at…the carnage on the s treet 
was not the result of a VBIED but, rather, the result of an undisciplined and excessive use 
of force by my Soldiers” (p. 17). In today’ s world inform ation is readily abundant and, 
perception is reality. In  order to build a str ong coalition and garn er the support of  the 
local popu lation in th eater, th e U.S. m ilitary needs to get its  version of events to  the 
media before the enemy.  
Therefore, it is CENTCOM’s belief and guidance 2 that their information sharing 
capability must move forward in a way that g ives warfighters the ability to shape th e IO 
battlefield in CENTCOM’s f avor. CENT COM claim s OB1 will help achieve this by 
providing timelier, accurate inform ation that the warfighter and his comm ander can use 
to, not only shape the physical battlefield, but the IO battlefield as well.  
“The f uture joint f orce requires an agile infor mation sharing environm ent 
supporting tactical, op erational, and strateg ic m ilitary o perations and training  with  
mission partners” (Network, 2008, p. 2). Acc ording to CENTCOM , “…the current 
architectural footprint is som ething they can no longer continue to scale operationally, 
logistically or financially.”  
The CENTCOM team argues in their CONOPS (Network, 2008): 
The United States will probably always fight as a jo int/coalition force in 
the future.  The politica l nature of Coalition compositions depends on the 
mission and situation, and sometimes requires us to operate under bilateral 
agreements.  Our cu rrent security policy  requires  that the n etwork 
classification dom ains must be kept  separate, hence m ultiple physical 
networks.  This m odel has resu lted in the deployment of multiple s ets of 
computing infrastructure—a solution that we cannot continue to scale 




2 Noted in USCENCOM’s Requirements Statement for Network Infrastructure Consolidation dated 
October 2007. 
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D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
To achieve the purpose outli ned in section I.A., we researched variou s onlin e 
websites and corresponded with several progr am m anagers and team  m embers of the 
various alternatives to O B1 in order to gain background inform ation and an operational 
description of those technol ogies. Next, a literature re view was conducted on business 
case writin g and reco mmended analytic stru cture. My thesis advisor and I have 
conducted a critical financial analysis of  data obtained from CENTCOM during their 
initial analysis of the f inancial viability of OB1. Finally, this thesis repo rts the results of 
the OB1 JCTD business  case analys is and makes relevant recommendations for decision 
makers.  
The following assumptions were made during the conduct of this analysis: 
 The cost savings derived from  the bus iness cas e analys is b ased on th e data 
available from a service or system can be applied across services and systems. 
 A conservative approach is adopted fo r the business case analysis. That is, 
when there is a choice between higher and lower costs, the higher cost will be 
used for the analys is. Sim ilarly, when there is a choice b etween higher and 
lower benefits, the lower benefit will be used for the analysis. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES (AOA) 
There are several other technologies, eith er fully or partially developed, that 
CENTCOM has evaluated as possible alternatives to OB1. From Table 1 we can see each 
alternative to OB1 that CENTCOM  has evaluated and reasons each technology does not 
meet CENTCOM requirem ents. Check m arks indicate failure to m eet a particular 
requirement. 











SOFCASE       
HAP       
CSTE       
COSMOS       
ACE       
DTW       
NetTop       
OB1      
 
Table 1.   Alternative technologies to OB1 and CENTCOM requirements 
A brief synopsis of each CENTCOM reviewed  AoA, as well as, reaso ns they do  
not achieve the OB1 objectives, follows: 
 
 
                                                 
3 CENTCOM uses chapter four of the Information Assurance Technical Framework to determine their 
assurance levels. 
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A. SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES CROSS DOMAIN SERVICES 
ARCHITECTURE AND SYSTEM ENHANCEMENTS (SOFCASE) 
SOFCASE is a project that is leveraging two major government efforts; the High 
Assurance Platform  (HAP) (m anaged by th e National Se curity Agency (NSA)) and a  
Cross Domain Solution (CDS) called Inform ation Support Server Environm ent (ISSE) 
managed by the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL).  The United States Southern Command 
(USSOCOM) is building an architecture to  address some specific te chnical, operational 
and acquisition requirements that are using technologies out of ex isting programs within 
these two organizations.  
SOFCASE is not a v iable alternative to OB1 because th ere is no curren t plan to  
meet high robustness, develop evaluation artifacts or meet CENTCOM assurance 
requirements for threat levels (Staneszewski, 2008, p. 39). 
B. HIGH ASSURANCE PLATFORM (HAP) 
According to the National Security Agency (NSA) website (High, 2009), “HAP is 
a multi-year NSA program with the vision to d efine a framework for the development of 
the next generation of secure com puting platforms. NSA conducts this effort in 
collaboration with industry, academia, and other government organizations.” 
The secure com puting workstatio ns th e HAP program  intends to build use 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) security  technologies coupled with the latest 
information assurance (IA) techniques. This  allows comm ercial vendors to develop 
assurable secure, m anageable, and usable co mputing platform com ponent products that 
integrate with a comm on architecture that wi ll enable integrators to deliver COTS-based 
assurable comm ercial solution s to  DoD, government and comm ercial entities (High, 
2009). 
HAP objectives include: 
 Provide a secure com puting platform  execution environm ent for operational 
users 
 Enable technology integrator s to com pose cost-effective assurable platfor m 
instances from COTS components 
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 Enable COTS technology developers to build assurable platform  components 
(hardware, software, firmware, I/O devices etc.) 
Even though HAP is pursuing a one wire solution similar to OB1 the tim e frame 
on that is approxim ately FY 2014. That tim eframe together with the fact they have no 
current plans for High Robustne ss makes HAP a less than desi rable alternative to OB1. 
(Staneszewski, 2008, p. 39). 
C. CLASSIFICATION – STATELESS, TRUSTED ENVIRONMENT (CSTE) 
JOINT COMBINED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (JCTD) 
CSTE is a Special Operations Comm and (SOCOM) sponsored JCTD. According 
to SOCOM, CSTE is “An assured (trus ted) electronic environment that has no inherent 
classification state when not processing or displaying data and is  independent of the  
classification level of the network(s) to which it is attached.” Its primary objectives are to 
have an ability to rapidly and securely share both unclassified and classif ied information 
between multiple coalition partners on a common operating system (network). As well as 
have a network that has the ability to qui ckly and dynamically host new capabilities and 
users.  
In order to m eet these objectives, CSTE in corporates a data object encapsulation 
component. These data objects are encrypted and can be in only one of four states: at rest, 
in transit, in process or being displayed. The Data Object Protection System  (DOPS)  
enables the protection of infor mation based on its conten t a t the  point of origin. C STE 
with DOPS implementation has several advantages: 
 It implements encryption of information (data at rest) on the local device 
 Access is based on content of the inform ation, user’s authorizations and 
location, and the capability of the device 
 It decouples the need for the infrastructure to protect the data 
Encryption of the data object is critical  for creating a classification– stateless 
environment and will protect the data when CSTE is under attack. 
 10
                                                
According to the OB1 team, CSTE does not meet their objectives because there is 
no current plan to m eet High Robus tness or develop evaluation artifacts (Staneszew ski, 
2008, p. 39). 
D. COALITION SECURE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS SYSTEM 
(COSMOS) ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION 
(ACTD) 
COSMOS is a European Command (EUC OM) and Pacific Comm and (PACOM) 
sponsored ACTD. In addition  to th e U.S. th e ACTD involves Aust ralia, Canada, Great 
Britain and more recently, Singapore. The goal is rapid, secure release and protectio n of 
critical comm and and c ontrol (C2) inform ation to and among coalition partners on a 
single and secure integrated coalition network to reduce confusion, uncertainty and delay 
in combat and cris is operations. The net r esult will be the bridging of  coalition so urced 
information with U.S. Global Inf ormation Grid (GIG) Network Centric Ente rprise 
Services (NCES) for two-way information exchange. 
The history of COSM OS ste ms from  Op eration Iraq i Freedom  (OIF) when 
Marine Forces Central Comm and (MARFO RCENT) could not rely on sneaker-net 4 
information because all of the restrictions  and security  m easures in place impeded 
operations and led to confusion. Today, COSM OS participants are developing a way to 
allow the unambiguous sharing of information between coalition partners and attem pting 
to collapse the number of operational networks required, while maintaining need-to-know 
levels of separation. C OSMOS wi ll also im plement the Multilatera l Interoperability 
Program (MIP) C2 Inform ation Exchange da ta Model (C2IEDM) and Data Exchange 
Mechanism (DEM) to address the unambiguous sharing aspects and use VPN technology 
augmented with configuration and control t ools to achieve the need-to-know separation 
requirements. The United States Nationa l Sec urity Agenc y (NSA) is  oversee ing the  
design of the security com ponents. Each pa rticipant nation will valid ate this appro ach 
against a national C2 system.  
 
4 The transfer of electronic information, especially computer files, by physically carrying removable 
media such as magnetic tape, floppy disks, compact discs, USB flash drives, or external hard drives from 
one computer to another. 
A brief by the COSMOS team (“COSMOS Aims”, 2009) states: 
There is more to multinational unity of effort than sharing C2 information, 
but the better the sharing, the bett er the poten tial for good m ultinational 
unity of effort. COSM OS i mproves C2 infor mation sharing by adding 
automation, security and dynamic management. Multinational partners are 
interested in sharing C2 information and commanders and coalitions have 
specific situation and role-based n eeds. However, each nation has long-
term interests that can undercut short-term unity of effort. (p. 4) 















CP 1  10%
CP 2 10%
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Coalition Partners receive 
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Figure 1.   COSMOS vs. Current Operations [From Cosmos Aims, Fig 1-1] 
The top line of Figure 1 shows the current  network architecture for the SIPRNET 
across DoD. In this scenario there is a release of information via a CDS to a multinational 
“space” or network clo ud. Within this cloud all inform ation is shared w ith all partn ers. 
The proble m with this inf rastructure is th at based on the current operational and/or 
tactical scenario more applicable information can and should be released. However, long-
term multinational interests significantly reduce this flow. 
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The middle row represents a current architecture that is sometimes employed, i.e., 
having many separate networks. Problem s with this approach include: high overhead in 
terms of equipm ent for  the physical networ k, and it does not give a comm ander the 
ability to a djust what inf ormation is dissem inated as th e operation  and battle  space  
evolve. 
The bottom option is what COSMOS claim s it can do for the cus tomer. This is  
also the preferred architecture suggested the by GIG IA strategy.  This type of network 
environment puts a U.S. node or enclave in th e national space with sufficient information 
security tools and inform ation management tools that the c ommander can stage the C2 
information he might share with partners (just as he stages ammunition and fuel forward) 
in the enclave and then share inform ation with partners as appropriate for the changing 
circumstances of the battlefield.  
It takes many months to build, test, and certify the rules for a CDS for a specific 
operation in  a specific theater. One of the greatest advan tages of COSMOS is that it 
allows real-time changes to information exchanges with coalition partners. 
Even with these advantages, the COSMOS ACTD does not meet the objectives of 
OB1 because it do es not collapse workstations or networks with multiple security levels. 
Also, COSMOS is data-centric and does not provide a network solu tion (Staneszewski, 
2008, p. 39). 
E. AGILE COALITION ENVIRONMENT (ACE) 
The ACE a rchitecture will soon b e instal led as com ponent of the Comm ander 
Third Fleet (C3F) command and control (C 2) Network . Physical location  f or the 
installation is C3F Headquarters in San Diego, CA, the Pacific Regional Netw ork 
Operations Center (PRNOC) and Naval Co mmunications and Tel ecommunications Area 




“The Agile Coalition Environment (ACE) system is a combination of commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) and open source products designed to provide users with the ability 
to access multip le U.S. and allied /Coalition secure domains f rom a single workstation”  
(Referentia Systems Inc., 2007, p. 5). 
The ACE program consists of a combined synergistic group of emerging network-
centric and infor mation assurance (IA) tec hnologies. These combined ACE technologies 
provide the warfighter with enhanced info rmation sharing, collaborative tools, and 
situational awareness capabil ities that are both dynam ic an d secure. Warfighters have 
access to all required us er applications and multiple security enclaves of information at a 
single workstation. Interoperabi lity is achieved acr oss all applications, platform s, and 
security do mains. ACE is  pres ented as a ne twork cap ability th at can be applied  to th e 
Combined Enterpr ise Regional In formation Exchange Sy stem (CENTRIXS) as well as  
other coalition or Community of Interest (COI) networks that require information sharing 
across multiple security dom ains between U. S. and coalition forces. ACE technologies 
have evolved during a f our-year spiral develo pment cycle and have targeted warfig hters 
at all levels for im proving interoperability  and knowledge m anagement for current and 
future joint and coalition operations. This  evolution for developing tom orrow's IT 
capabilities has been base d on requirem ents, technology insertion, operational 
experimentation, and improvem ents as a resu lt of Joint, Coalit ion, and Naval Fleet 
feedback (Referentia Systems Inc., 2007, p. 5). 
According to Referentia Systems Inc (2007): 
The ACE archite cture is  designed to  provide ac cess to  multiple s ecurity 
enclaves from a single term inal th rough the use of two Cross Dom ain 
Management Office base lined capabilities: NetTop 1.3.1 and JANUS 5.1.  
NetTop uses Virtual Machines (VMs) to provide separation on the client 
terminal be tween secu rity enc laves.  A term inal use r is no t a llowed to  
move information between enclave s.  The C3F insta llation will cons ist of 
14 ACE terminals that will be  capable of accessing SIPRNET, Combined 
Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System – 4Eyes (CENTRIXS-
4Eyes), the Cooperative Maritim e Forces Pacific (CMFP) virtual private 
network (VPN) on Combined Enterpri se Regional Information Exchange 
System – Global Counterterroris m Force (CENTRIXS-GCTF) , and 
Combined Enterpr ise Regional In formation Exchange System  – Japan 
(CENTRIXS-JPN). (p. 5) 
For the C3F setup in San Diego and Hawaii, the ACE ter minal uses NetTop 1.3.1 
to create “Fat” and “Th in” Virtual Machines  (VMs) (referred t o as “GUI” VMs) t hat 
connect to the four secu rity domains.  For  SIPRNET, the ACE Term inals will u se a Fat 
VM that will allow the use of  any data typ e that the SIPRNET applica tions use.  Fo r the 
three CENTRIXS networks, the  ACE Terminals will use a Thin VM.  For the Th in VMs 
only, ICA type traf fic will be use d to commu nicate with Citrix se rvers loca ted in the  
respective CENTRIXS data centers (Referentia Systems Inc., 2007, p. 5). 
ACE achieves security separation thr ough the use of NetTop, VMs and Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs). Each VM is tied to one VPN VM that uses  and IPSec client to 
establish a connection with a VPN Concentrat or in th e da ta cen ter. All ACE ter minals 
and associated VMs are capable using one network interface card (NIC). Note in Figure 2 
that the ACE term inals have no in teraction with VPN VM. VPN V Ms are automatically 
launched w hen the graphical user interface (G UI) VM is launched an d they stay open 
until the GUI VM is shut down (Referentia Systems Inc., 2007, p. 6). 
 
Figure 2.   NetTop VMs in an ACE architecture [From Referentia Systems Inc, Figure 
1] 
Some of these concerns m ay not be va lid, the OB1 team claim s that the ACE 
technology does not collapse m ultiple networks, does not support High Robustness and 




F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS (DODIIS) TRUSTED WORKSTATION (DTW) 
DTW was designed f or and is m ostly used by the DoD intellig ence community. 
“DTW is an Air Force C ommand, Contro l, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Center sponsored, Defense Intelligence Agency  (DIA) directed 
capability f or using a  single des ktop workstation to a ccess a ll DoDIIS data  and 
applications available  to a par ticular use r from multiple,  concurr ent security do mains” 
(DoD Trusted, 2006). It is designed to provid e a standard intellig ence system  coupled 
with applications interoperability that enables collaboration between intelligence sites in 
a secure an d tim ely manner. DTW  is an initia tive tha t was jointly developed b y Sun 
Microsystems and Trusted Computer Solutions (TCS). 
1. DTW and Trusted Computer Solutions (TCS) 
The TCS website states: 
As with a ll organ izations m anaging critical inte lligence tasks,  DoD 
intelligence sites face a major challenge in securely sharing information in 
a tim ely manner. This  challeng e led the Defense Intelligence Agency  
(DIA) to turn to a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) product from  Trusted 
Computer Solutions (T CS), a leader in secure infor mation sharing. They 
selected the TCS flagship deskt op product, SecureOffice® Trusted 
Workstation™, as an integral com ponent of the Departm ent of Defense 
Intelligence Information Systems (DoDIIS) Trusted Workstation (DTW). 
The DIA then assigned the Joint En terprise DoDIIS Infrastructure (JE DI) 
Program Management Office (PMO) to manage the program. The use of a 
single, ultra-thin client via Truste d Workstation to access multiple lev els 
of classified data and then dissem inate actionable inform ation provides 
many benefits, including: enhanced security, enhanced  functionality, 
enhanced audit m anagement, simplifie d installation and adm inistration, 
reduced sup port costs and ease of certification  and accred itation. DTW 
enables intelligence o rganizations to ensur e high-r isk processe s a re 
automated in a predictable, au ditable and accreditable manner. (JEDI 
PMO, n.d.) 
2. DoDIIS Trusted Workstation 
DoDIIS Trusted W orkstation is a JEDI  PMO m anaged standard solution that 
includes the following features (JEDI PMO, n.d.): 
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 Ultra-Thin Client Appliance 
 Full Microsoft® Windows® application and network functionality 
 E-mail, Web browsing and collaboration 
 JEDI Tools – Trusted Se ssion Maintenance, Trusted User Maintenance, 
Enhanced Password Rules, User Password Utility, and Jumpstart scripts 
 TCS Trusted Relabeler  – enables  the secure m ovement of infor mation 
between security levels 
 TCS trusted administration and configuration tools 
 Existing application integration 
 Simultaneous access to multiple classified networks 
 Single DTW baseline image 
3. DTW Return-on-Investment 
Because D TW helps individuals, and ther efore org anizations, gain access  to  
secure inf ormation acro ss m ultiple networks  and classif ication lev els using  f amiliar 
software applications DTW enables organizations to improve security and accountability 
in the high op-tem po environm ent that t oday’s DoD operates in . Other advantages 
include (JEDI PMO, n.d.): 
 Dramatically decrease the number of desktop workstations via ultra thin client 
architecture 
 Reduce network and infrastructure costs 
 Increase intelligence staff productivity 
 Reduce information technology staff workload 
 Provide simultaneous access to multiple networks across classification levels 
from a single screen 
 Provide session mobility 
 Previously accredited and operational solution 
 17
However, as the OB1 team (Staneszewsk i, 2008, p. 39) points out, and verified in 
a separate report by NYTOR Technologies (T he DoDIIS, 2007, p. 3), one of the m ajor 
disadvantages to DTW  is that DTW is accr edited under Director of  Central Intelligence 
Directive (DCID) 6/3 (m anual for protecting sensitive compartmented information (SCI) 
within information systems) at a level tha t only permits access to networks ranging from  
SECRET (including collateral) through TS/SCI sim ultaneously. Also, according to the 
same reports from  OB1 and NYTOR, DTW cost  up to ten tim es what OB1 would (cost 
per seat: $10k-$18k). F urthermore, it does not provide high robustness (Staneszewski, 
2008, p. 39) or provide access to UNLCAS networks (The DoDIIS, 2007, p. 3). 
Other possible concerns with DTW addressed in the May 2007 white paper by 
NYTOR technologies (The DoDIIS, 2007) include: 
 All program executio n occurs o n the se rver; applica tions that cannot be 
executed in a Citrix shared application environment are not supported 
 Streaming video executes on the server, resulting in exceptionally high 
bandwidth requirements and poor performance 
 Smartcard does not provide strong authentication or use an X.509 certificate 
 Does not provide machine authentication 
 Does not support printing 
 Does not provide USB support 
 Does not provide expansion slots 
 Does not presently support multiple monitors 
 Requires Trusted So laris adm inistrators to m aintain its serve r-side 
infrastructure 
 Is better su ited for env ironments where there is a strong  need for UNIX 
applications or UNIX is already the dominant operating system 
G. NETTOP 
NetTop was initially developed in 1999 by the National Security Agency (NSA). 
It was about this tim e the NSA realized much of its technolo gy was changing over from  
government produced products to commercial products. It was with  this transition, 
 18
combined with the rapid growth of  inf ormation technologies and the even m ore rapid 
increases in cheaper and faster com puting power, that the NSA realized it could not k eep 
pace in its ability to p rotect information processed by the n ational security community. 
Historically, technologies flowed from within government to our homes. The Information 
Age and explosion in cost effective com puting power has begun to reverse that trend. 
Now more and m ore t echnologies are co ming from  commercial vendors vice inside 
government and NSA. To further exacerb ate the inform ation assurance problem  NSA 
also re alized m ore and m ore R&D dollars were going away from  a reas designed to 
protect the data to that of intrusion detection and response (NetTop Commercial, 2000, p. 
1). 
To address  the issues  the NSA Advi sory B oard (NSAAB) challenged the 
Information Assurance Research Office (IARO) to develop architectures that would not 
only have the look and feel of Commercial- off-the-shelf (COTS) products but w ould 
utilize them as well. Ke y to the su ccess of the team would be the  ability to us e the new 
technology in a high assurance environment. The result of their effort is NetTop (NetT op 
Commercial, 2000, p. 1). 
As is the ca se with  OB1, and the r est of  these  alterna tives, NetTop a ttempts to 
address one of the m ajor concerns for the warf ighter and that is the am ount of desktops 
(CPUs, m onitors, keyboards, m ice, etc.) th at are necessary  in order to  have acces s to 
multiple networks of different sensitivity at one user workstation. Other concerns NetTop 
attempts to address are: previous governm ent based security so lutions have been 
incompatible with other standards based IT products, this complicates the interoperability 
and upgrading of components, cost and com plexity of network adm inistration and the 
ability to rapidly add and remove users holding multiple security levels and from multiple 
DoD, gover nment agencies and m ultiple coa lition partners.  In general the overarching 
goal of NetTop (as well as, OB1 an d most of the other alternatives) is to deliver multiple 
network domains to one workstation in order to eliminate redundant hardware and reduce 
the total cost of ownership (TCO) of high-assurance computing. 
One of the consequences of requiring a high assurance platf orm for the end-user 
is that the end-user’s environment must be considered untrustworthy. NetTop architecture 
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must protect against potentia lly hostile behavior. In order to do this, NSA bega n to 
explore the concept of encapsulation to limit, or minimize, the effects of the end-us er OS 
and application software.  
According to Meushaw and Simard (2000): 
The method selected for encapsulati ng the OS was based upon a 30-year-
old technology, Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM). VMM technology was 
designed and developed in the era of large IBM mainframe computers, and 
was intended to help extend the life of legacy s oftware, when im proved 
hardware or OS software was released. In essence, a VMM was a software 
system that ran direc tly on the com puter hardware, and allowed multiple 
operating system s to be installed on top of it. By running older OS 
versions in som e virtual m achines, legacy software could be run, while 
newer application software cou ld b e executed in virtu al m achines (VM ) 
running m ore current OS versions . During this initial design and 
production phase NSA discovered a new commercial product called 
VMware. VMware pro vided a  co mmercially available  ap plication th at 
could be integrated with VMMs. The VMware product is a spin-off of 
DARPA-sponsored research at Stanf ord University, and is generally used 
for providing a safe test environm ent for OS and networking software. (p.  
2) 
Meushaw and Si mard (2000, p.2) also clai med VMware had several advantages 
that made it attractive to the NetTop design team: 
 VMware was designed for efficient ope ration on Intel x86 platform s vice 
large mainframe computers. This made it more suitable for NetTop’s end-user 
who uses laptops, PCs and Thin Clients 
 VMware operates on top of an underlying hos t OS rather than directly on the 
system hardware 
 VMware provides and abstraction for vi rtual Ethernet hubs. Allows virtual 
machines to be interconnected in a way that is well understood by network 
administrators and designers 
In 2005 NSA reached a licensing agreem ent with two commercial vendors which 
allows them to develop and m arket NetTop technology. Those commercial vendors are 
Hewlett Packard (HP) and Trusted Com puting Solutions (T CS). Both vendors are using 
the SELinux OS as the m ain building bloc k in their architectur e. E ven though both 
vendors benefit from  all the advantages  of  NetTop technology, there are subtle 
 
differences in the technology used by the vendors, which m eet the original final  
objectives of the NSAAB. Both HP and TCS system s are currently undergoing 
certification and accreditation.  
1. HP NetTop 
A HP technical report (“HP NetTop”,  2004) posted on their website describes 
their version of NetTop as follows:  
Between the VM vaults provided by  SELinux policy and the absence of 
any comm unication interface in th e HP NetT op SELinux host OS, HP 
NetTop can be viewed as a software keyboard, video, mouse (KVM) 
device for switching between VMs. You don’t need separate networks and 
multi-network in terface card  (NIC ) wo rkstations to b enefit f rom HP 
NetTop. HP NetTop works with VPNs  to provide end-to-end data 
encryption between different VMs and their virtual private network (VPN) 
termination points. In the sam e way that VMs can be bound to different 
physical NICs connected to different  network backbones,  this single 
network solution allow s HP NetTop to be used in any network where 
secure data separation is required. (p.3) 
An operational description of NP NetTop is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.   HP NetTop [From HP NetTop, Fig 2] 
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2. TCS NetTop 
TCS NetTop also uses SELi nux as for the host OS. However, a m ajor difference 
between the HP architecture and T CS is that TCS does not  use VPN technology as its  
core piece of equipment used to link m ultiple networks. TCS has developed what it calls  
a Distribution Center (DC). It is this DC  that controls all networking and routing 
functions. The DC is als o a SELinux based sy stem that provides a multilevel gateway to 
single level networks (a prope rly configured NIC is requ ired for each system high 
network). The DC handles the adm inistrative functions via a user frie ndly graphical user 
interface (G UI), au tomatically commonly configures and authenticates  each  end-u sers 
Thin Client (workstation) and provides automatic failover and load distribution (SELinux 
Symposium, 2007, p.10). 
OB1, and m any of these alternatives to OB1, have the ability to se t up their  
network with Thin Clients on the user end.  The use of Thin Clients for the end user has 
many advantages, m ost notably, in the ar ea of infor mation assurance and com puter 
security. TCS has done an excellent job of le veraging all the advantag es of Thin Client 
computing and the NSA approved NetTop technology.  
However, a ccording to  the  OB1 team , NetTop alone does not m eet the OB1 
objectives of High Robustness and developm ent of evaluation artifacts (Staneszewski, 
2008, p. 39). 
As you can see from Table 1 in the beginning of this chapter, these alternatives to 
OB1 meet some, but not all, of the criteria  set forth by the CENTCOM commander in his 
Requirements Statem ent for Network Infras tructure Consolidation (“USCENTCOM,”  
2007). The most notable exception to CENTCO M’s requirements is the lack of a high 
robustness capability. The following chapter provides an OB1 operational description and 
shows how OB1 will meet CENTCOM’s requirement for high robustness. 
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III. OB1 OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION 
A. CURRENT NETWORK ENVIRONMENT (“AS-IS”) 
CENTCOM’s network architecture is a microcosm of the larger DoD network. 
CENTCOM users are required to a ccess multiple networks in order  to a ccomplish their  






Figure 4 sh ows a typic al CENTCOM user workstation with m ultiple com puter 
CPUs, keyboards, m onitors and m ice. Due to  the current DoD requirem ent to have 
networks of varying classification air gapped, eac h individual user is required to have all 
this ne twork architec ture at  th eir workstation.  This pa rticular network requirement 
significantly burdens the warfighter in areas such as: 
 Expense of additional computers 
 Expense of additional network architecture 
 Expense of additional cooling requirements 
 Expense of additional network administrative and maintenance personnel 
 Additional time to install and maintain 
 Excessive time requirements needed to deploy/re-deploy 
 Lack of timely and pertinent information available to the warfighter 
  
 Figure 4.   Typical Desktop Environment [From Network, Figure 2-1] 
“The current mode of operation is to provide a desktop for each network.  Each 
desktop is connected by fiber or CAT-5 cable  to a distribution fr ame which connects to 
each of the data centers for each network.  Type-1 encryption devices are used to  
interconnect enclaves (buildings, etc.).  These networks range from  UNCLASSIFIED to 
TOP SECRET.  These components are generally replaced every three to five years as part 
of the lif e-cycle m aintenance p rogram.  The cables  f rom the d esktops are  with in a  
“protected d istribution s ystem” (PDS).  Da ta is  encryp ted when leavin g the PDS and 
decrypted when re-entering the data center PDS” (Network, 2008, p. 3). 
In order to function as a comm and and carry out it s orders, CENTCOM often 
deploys teams of individual users to remote, unsecure locations. These locations are often 
in an unstable, high threat  environm ent. Due to the am ount of netw ork equipm ent 
required, the current network infrastructure is not conducive to a rapid deploy/re-deploy 




B. NETWORK ENVIRONMENT WITH OB1 (“TO BE”) 
The propos ed OB1 architect ure will allow  for a sin gle infrastructure of 
workstations, switches and cables ( see Figure 5). This so lution has m ultiple benefits on 
many di fferent levels: less power consum ption, easier to set-up/take down, easier to 
deploy/re-deploy and eases m any network adm inistrative burdens, i.e., adding/rem oving 
users from the network, adding/rem oving computers from the network, adding/rem oving 
networks to at a workstation. In their C ONOPS, the OB1 team  states, “This solution 
interoperates with leg acy and  c oalition partner system s and allows for a rapid 
configuration of communities of interest (COI) without m ajor physical changes to the 
network.  This solution m aximizes the use of our current IT investm ents” (Network 
Infrastructure, 2008, p. 5). 
 
What we can achieve with OB1 
(Operational View – OV1) 
Collapse the network and one box-one wire
with high robustness
Legacy Non-Collapsed Environment: 
Enclave Data Center / External WAN
Secure Ethernet
Switch









Figure 5.   OB1 Operational View [From Network, Fig 2-2] 
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Figure 6 shows what a  typical network architecture would look like with OB1. 
OB1 is not an attem pt to modify the curren t way information is tr ansferred across entire 
networks. What OB1 attempts to do is modify the last mile of the network inf rastructure 
in such a way that reduces the burden of ha ving a large network footprint that is not  
conducive to information sharing in a multinational environment. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Typical OB1 LAN Architecture [From Network Infrastructure, Fig 3] 
The primary components of OB1 consist of  several technologies being developed 
by two primary vendors,  Green Hills  Software (GHS) and Objectiv e Interface Solutions 
(OIS). Their products are: 
 Green Hills Software 
o INTEGRITY® Operating System 
o INTEGRITY® Separation Kernel 
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 Objective Interface Solutions 
o Black Channel Gigabit Switch 
o Black Channel Network Interface Card (BC NIC) 
o Black Channel Administrator 
o Black Channel Authorizer 
In Figure 6, the INTEGRITY® OS, Separa tion Kernel and BC NIC would reside 
on or in the CPU 5 (OB1-PC) associated with each m onitor in the respected enclave. The 
three BC Gigabit switches are labeled “OB 1-Switch” a nd they ar e located in  the 
appropriate Server Rm (Farm). 
Together, these four components allow a single user to access m ultiple networks 
of varying classification from a single workstation.  
1. Cross Domain Solution 
A cross do main solution (CDS) is def ined as an inform ation assurance solution 
that provides the ability to manually and/or automatically access and/or transfer between 
two or more differing security dom ains (CJCSI, p. GL-5). O B1 is not a CDS. According 
to the  OB1 team  the Unif ied Command Dom ain Managem ent Off ice6 (UCDMO) has  
termed OB1 as an acces s CDS. What that means is OB1 will not be ab le to transfer data 
directly f rom one security clas sification leve l to another i.e., have  th e ability to s end 
and/or receive data from the SIPRNET while logged onto the NIPRNET and vice versa. 
2. High Robustness 
One of the major advantages and benefits of OB1 is its high robustness capability. 
CENTCOM uses chapter four of the Info rmation Assurance Technical Fram ework 
(IATF) as their guida nce for inform ation as surance. The IATF defines what high 
 
5 OB1 is compatible with and intends to use legacy commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) CPUs. 
6 Established in July 2006. All DoD and Intelligence Community cross domain efforts now fall under 
their jurisdiction.  
robustness is, as well as, other inform ation assurance requirements that need to be met in 
order for a network architecture to achieve certain standardized levels of security. 
The OB1 team using the IATF as g uidance defines high robust ness as proving to 
the maximum extent possible, that information is secure, even in high threat environment. 
For CENTCOM, a high threat env ironment wo uld be defined as Afghanistan, Iraq or  
similar operating environm ents. Figure 7 show s where high robustness falls in a high 
threat level, high information type environment. 
 
Figure 7.   High Robustness Chart [From Staneszewski, Fig 3] 
For the OB1 critical components (GHS and OIS vendor products) high robustness 
requires: 
 Formal Methods Evaluation – m athematical proof that the com ponent 
enforces security policy under all possible conditions 
 Exhaustive testing – total test cove rage, docum entation of processes, 
requirements, and traceability 
 Penetration testing by skilled NSA attackers 
All testing, proofs, and pro cesses are docum ented in a st ructured set of artifacts 
for use by Information Assurance evaluators, certifiers, and accreditors. 
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According to CENTCOM’s Requirem ents Statem ent dated October 2007, 
CENTCOM requires th e capability to access separate netw orks on a s ingle workstation 
connected to a single wire which is connected to a data center that stores information for 
those networks. Objectives of the new networ k architecture include redu ced workstation 
and network infrastructure, a reduction in th e requirement to air gap infor mation across 
domains and the ability to interoperate w ith deployed Coalition partner system s. The  
solution m ust take into consideration the cost of developm ent, i mplementation and 
certification, use of legacy system s and peri pherals and it m ust strive to m inimize 
disruption of the existing system . CENTCO M believ es OB1 m eets all of their stated  
requirements and objectives. An independent Business Case Analysis of OB1 wi ll be 
used to help verify CENTCOMs belief that OB1 is, in fact, a viable solution. 
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IV. BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS (BCA) DEFINED 
A. BUSINESS CASE ANALYSES 
The Defens e Acquisition (DAU) website describes a BCA as “…a best-value 
analysis that considers not only cost, but other quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors 
supporting an investm ent decision. This can in clude, but is not lim ited to, perform ance, 
producibility, reliabilit y, m aintainability, and supportabil ity enhancem ents.” It is an 
important business tool that he lps decision makers to evaluate alternative approaches and 
to decide on the allocation of scarce resources. The unde rlying purpose of a BCA i s to 
evaluate the financial soundness of a proposed  solution to a problem  with a financial 
analysis that will supply the decis ion maker with one important piece of information that 
will be considered together with other factors that bear on the decision.   
It is important to note that a BCA is an all-purpose commonly used term and may 
also be referred to as Cost/Benefit Anal ysis, Cost of Ownership Analysis, Econom ic 
Analysis or Return on Investm ent (ROI) Analysis. Each term implies a slightly d ifferent 
approach in answering the general question:  “What are the likely financial and other 
business consequences if we take this or th at action (or decision)? ” Since none of these 
terms have a single precise or universally agreed upon definition, it is important to clarify 
our definition of a BCA. 
In order to meet that objective, this thesis will model its BCA approach from  that 
recommended by the DAU and s ummarized in a previous Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) thesis titled “A Methodical Approach for Conducting a Business Case Analysis for 
the Joint Distance S upport and Response (JDSR) Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD),” dated December 2006.  
As a minimum a BCA should include: 
 An introduction that states what the case is about and why it is necessary 
 A statement specifying assumptions and constraints 
 Identify possible alternatives and status quo 
 An estimate of costs and benefits of each alternative 
 A Sensitivity and risk analysis 
 A conclusion and recommendations 
Most financial analyses can be described as a four phase process, our BCA is no 
different. Figure 8 shows our BCA concept as defined by the DAU on their website. 
 
Figure 8.   BCA methodology as defined by the DAU [From Defense, Fig 1-3] 
1. Definition 
In this phase, the scope of the analysis is defined. In order to do this, assumptions 
and constraints that will guide the analysis m ust be clarified . Analysts also identify the 
number of  alte rnatives the BCA will cons ider. The def inition stage ca n of ten m ake or 
break a BCA. It lays the groundwork for th e BCA, communicating to decision-m akers 
the reasoning of the analysts, which establishes the credibility of the BCA. 
2. Data Collection 
The plan will specify the types of data required, the potential data sources, and the 
approaches to obtain these data. Often tim es the data  ar e d ifficult to o btain. It m ay be 
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hidden in company’s databases accessible onl y to limited number of company personnel, 
it may be  hidden deep in financial spreadshee ts or, if it is a new technology, that data 
simply may not be available yet. In situations  where the req uired data are not available, 
an estimate is made with the approach for calculating the estimate clearly explained and 
documented. There are several costs es timating appro aches available: param etric 
estimation, analogy estim ation and engineeri ng estimation. Upon the completion of data 
collection, the data are exam ined for consistency and anomalies. Thereafter, the data ar e 
normalized to support “apple to apple” com parisons, such as adjustm ent for 
inflation/deflation to account for the time value of money. 
3. Evaluation Analysis 
In this phase, analysts do the actual br eakdown of the data obtained in the data 
collection phase. Here, analys ts build a cas e for each alternative us ing both qualitative 
and quantitative data. Each al ternative is  co mpared aga inst th e bas eline to de termine 
which one has the best overall value. So metimes this c an be ex tremely dif ficult, 
especially if com paring both quantitative data and qualitative  data. O ne tool to help 
convert the data to a common ba seline is the analytic hierar chy process (AHP). AHP is a 
process that assigns numerical values to different aspects of an alternative and eventually 
assigns an overall numerical score to each alternative. This process allows analyst to rank 
alternatives in order of preference.  
Once all the data have been collected by the analyst, a risk analysis and sensitivity 
analysis sho uld be don e. A risk  ana lysis attem pts to  pred ict the like lihood of  an ev ent 
occurring, and the poten tial impact of that on the case. A sensitiv ity analysis attempts to 
explain what happens if assumptions change or prove wrong, typical “What if” scenarios. 
A sensitiv ity analysis s hould show how sens itive your models’ overall outpu ts are to 
changes in input and how those changes impact the bottom line.  
4. Results Presentation 
The best analysis in the world is worthless if the results of that  analysis cannot be 
clearly articulated  to  th e decision -makers. Conclusions should stat e the resu lts o f the 
analysis clearly and succinct ly as supported by previous ev idence. Effective conclusions 
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are based o n the upfro nt stated  ob jectives. It  is here that analys ts should explain any 
unexpected results or findings that could be misinterpreted. 
Throughout the BCA process quantitative data  should be expresse d in charts and 
graphs. One should not expect  decision-m akers to labor through the analytic process 
attempting to ascertain the results of  analysis on their own. The anal ysts should tell them 
exactly what is meant and why.  
An effective BCA must also contain  a recommended course of action (COA) for 
the decision-m akers. The BCA should provi de reasonable support to back up analysts 
recommendations; enou gh support that the average person  would find com pelling. A 
recommendation should bring closure to the analysis by reminding the reader the analytic 
part of the BCA process is done and the future of the project, the way ahead, is once  
again up to them.  
B. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE (WBS) 
 A WBS has a hierarch ical tree structure th at captures all the work of a project in  
an organized way. A WBS can be product or process oriented based on the ultimate end-
items of the project. The Departm ent of Defense handbook (MIL-HDBK-881, 2005) had 
defined WBS as: 
A WBS displays and defines the produc t, or products, to be developed 
and/or produced. It relates the elem ents of  wor k to b e a ccomplished to 
each other and to the en d product. A WBS can be exp ressed down to any  
level of interest. However the top three levels are as far as any program  or 
contract need go unless the item s iden tified are high cost  or high risk. 
Then, and only then, is it im portant to take the work breakdown structure 
to a lower level of definition. 
There are several benefits to having a W BS planned out properly for a project. A 
WBS helps to keep track of the schedule, resource allocation, cash flow, expenditures, 
and performance of the project.  Another goal is to provide a systematic and standardized 
method for  gathering cost data across all pr ograms. Ha ving actual hi storical data to 
support cost estimates of similar defense materiel items is a valuable resource. 
 
C. NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) ANALYSIS 
Net Present Value of an investm ent is defined as the sum of the present values of 
the annual cash flows. The annual cash flows are the Net Benefits (revenues minus costs) 
generated from  the investm ent during its li fetime. These cash flows are discounted or 
adjusted by incorporatin g the uncertainty a nd time value of m oney. An investment with 
the larger NPV is a better option. The formula for calculating NPV is as follows: 
 1 1
the time of the cash flow
the total time of the project
the discount rate






















Discount rate is the rate used to discount future cash flows to their present values. 
An approach to choosing the discount rate fact or is to decide the rate w hich the capital 
needed for the project could retu rn if invested in an a lternative venture. For our analysis 
of OB1, a discount rate of 3%  was chosen for the baseline com putation, because that is 
the current return of 10-year U.S. Treasury not es. This factor is in accordance with the 
instruction from  Office of Managem ent a nd Budget, which instructs U.S. governm ent 
investment analyses to use a di scount factor equal to th e interest rate o n U.S. Trea sury 
notes whose duration equals the duration of the investment being analyzed. 
D. RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI) ANALYSIS 
Return on Investm ent (ROI) m easures the ratio of m oney gain ed or lost on an 
investment relative to the amount of money invested. An Annualized ROI is used here to 
calculate the investm ent over a certain period. An investment  with a higher annualized 
ROI is a better investm ent option than an i nvestment with a  lower annualized ROI. For 




E. PAYBACK PERIOD  
Payback period answers the question of “ When does the investm ent pay for  
itself?” It o ccurs at th e point wh ere th e cumulative cash inflows are equal to the 
cumulative cash outflows, i.e., no net loss or gain. 
F. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A sensitivity analysis is a process of varying the input parameters of a model over 
a reasonable range and observing the relative change in the model output. The purpose of 
the sensitivity analysis is to determ ine the se nsitivity of a m odel result to uncertainty in 
the input data, as in the case of financial an alyses evaluating multiple alternatives where  
an uncertain assum ption m ight change the se lection of a recommende d alterna tive. In 
cases such as those, the assum ption is allo wed to generate data at the upper and lower 
bounds of its confidence interval to test whether or not the recommendation supported by 
the basic assumption would be changed by modifying the values of the financial data that 
are based on the assumption. 
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V. OB1 BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
A. OB1 WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE (WBS) 
The top level WBS for the OB1 JCTD consis ts of Investment and Operations and 
Support.  These WBS elements are described in the paragraphs below. 
1. Investment 
The investment for OB1 consists of 
 Design, development, test and evaluation of GHS INTEGRI TY® secure  
operating system and separation kernel 
 Objective Interface Solution’s Black Channel NICs and switches 
 Software and hardware integration and configuration 
 Robustness certification for the INTEGRITY® PC and OIS’s Black 
Channel NIC and switch 
2. Operations and Support (O&S) 
The O&S consists of 
 Upgrading or replacing all hardware and/or software on a recurring basis 
as deem ed appropriate by individual  comm ands. For our evaluation w e 
used the CENTCOM recommended refresh cycle of three years. 
 Administrative and m aintenance pers onnel. For our evaluation we used 
CENTCOM recommended numbers based on the size of their network. 
B. ANALYSIS OF CENTCOM DATA 
The following sections provide a financial analysis of the cash flows that resu lt 
from investing in OB1 and then operating and supporting it.  Baseline estim ates for the 
cash flows were supplied by CE NTCOM’s OB 1 team .  Additional data are the 
professional judgm ents myself and my thesis  advisor. Complete data can be found in 
Appendix A and B. All costs are in FY 09 unless otherwise stated. 
1. Net Present Value (NPV) Analysis 
Our base case analys is for OB1 assum es a three-year im plementation phase in 
which OB1 will com plete re search and developm ent, in cluding test and evaluation, 
robustness and integrity (Information A ssurance (IA)) certifications and other 
accreditations and certif ications. We estimate these implementation phase, non-recurring 
investment costs at $13.7M for year one, $12.9M for year two and $9.3M for year three.  
Our base case analysis assumes FY 2009 dollar values; other base case parameters 
include a discount factor (df) of  3% and a recurring investm ent7 of $1.8M every three 
years (assuming a three year refresh cycle). 
The investment and savings data in the fo llowing NPV tables were obtained from 
the CENTCOM OB1 team . See Appendix A and B for further details. The tables b elow 
show a detailed analysis of the data provided by CENTCOM. 
Specifically, NPV is computed using the following formula: 
 1 1
the time of the cash flow
the total time of the project
the discount rate






















Specifically, t = 1, 2, 3…13, n = 13, r = 0.03 and C = NPV Savings year 1, year 2, 
year 3…year 13.  As shown in Ta ble 2, over 13 years, we find that our base case analysis 
of OB1gives us a NPV Savings of $263.1M. 
                                                 
7 The recurring investment comes from the upgrade and replacement of the OB1 Network Architecture 
every three years (CENTCOMM recommendation). 
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Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Investment -13.7 -12.9 -9.3 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8
Savings 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.7 15.9 23.9 102.7 31.9 31.9 102.7 31.9 31.9 102.7
Net Savings -13.7 -12.9 -9.3 23.8 15.9 23.9 100.9 31.9 31.9 100.9 31.9 31.9 100.9
df % Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 NPV Savings
3% -13.7 -12.5 -8.8 21.8 14.2 20.6 84.5 25.9 25.2 77.3 23.7 23.0 70.7 263.1
5% -13.7 -12.3 -8.5 20.6 13.1 18.7 75.3 22.6 21.6 65.0 19.6 18.6 56.2 183.9
10% -13.7 -11.7 -7.7 17.9 10.9 14.8 56.9 16.3 14.9 42.8 12.3 11.2 32.1 76.2
Remaining N-R Investment Recurring Investment + O&S Savings ($M)
Base Case Plus $0.0M Additional Non-Recurring Investment
NPV Savings ($M)
 
Table 2.   OB1 NPV after 13 years with $0.0M Additional Non-Recurring Initial Investment 
NPV Savings (13yrs) = $263.1M  
We can also see from  Table 2 that in  year four (the first year of OB1 
implementation at CENTCOM), using a 3% df, that we have NPV Sa vings of $21.8M. 
This tells us that OB1 saves m oney from its  first year of implem entation. It should be 
noted th at OB1 is assum ed to us e th e Life Cycle Replacem ent m ethod8 for  
implementation. Thus, for our analysis, we phased in the benefits of OB1. Specifically, in 
year four w e assumed OB1 would only achieve  a 25% savings, year five 50%, year six 
75%, and finally, OB1 will reach its full savings potential in years seven and beyond.  
At CENTCOM m ost of the network architect ure gets replaced every th ree years. 
Since, one o f the prim ary objectives that OB1 achieves  is the consolid ation of  multiple 
networks (NIPR, SIPR, JW ICS, etc) OB1 pr ovides a m uch sm aller f ootprint th an the  
current network architecture. Because of th is sm aller footprin t, OB1 obtains a large 
amount of savings (in hardware , software, personnel) every third year (years 7, 10, 13, 
etc). Consequently, we expect the savings of OB1 to be even m ore com pelling over a 
period of 23 years than over 13.  
Using the same formula as above for NPV,  from Table 3 we can  see that, with a 
3% df over a period of 23 years, OB1 yields a NPV savings of $444.7M. 
 
 
                                                 
8 With the Life Cycle Replacement method legacy systems will be swapped out with OB1 when the 
legacy systems are normally scheduled for replacement. 
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 Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Investment -13.7 -12.9 -9.3 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 0.0
Savings 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.7 15.9 23.9 102.7 31.9 31.9 102.7 31.9 31.9 102.7 31.9 31.9 102.7 31.9 31.9 102.7 31.9 31.9 102.7 31.9
Net Savings -13.7 -12.9 -9.3 23.8 15.9 23.9 100.9 31.9 31.9 100.9 31.9 31.9 100.9 31.9 31.9 100.9 31.9 31.9 100.9 31.9 31.9 100.9 31.9
df % Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 NPV Savings
3% -13.7 -12.5 -8.8 21.8 14.2 20.6 84.5 25.9 25.2 77.3 23.7 23.0 70.7 21.7 21.1 64.7 19.9 19.3 59.2 18.2 17.6 54.2 16.6 444.7
5% -13.7 -12.3 -8.5 20.6 13.1 18.7 75.3 22.6 21.6 65.0 19.6 18.6 56.2 16.9 16.1 48.5 14.6 13.9 41.9 12.6 12.0 36.2 10.9 276.1
10% -13.7 -11.7 -7.7 17.9 10.9 14.8 56.9 16.3 14.9 42.8 12.3 11.2 32.1 9.2 8.4 24.1 6.9 6.3 18.1 5.2 4.7 13.6 3.9 94.9
Remaining N-R Investmen Recurring Investment + O&S Savings ($M)
Base Case Plus $0.0M Additional Non-Recurring Investment
NPV Savings ($M)
 
Table 3.   OB1 NPV after 23 years with $0.0M Additional Non-Recurring Initial Investment 
NPV Savings (23yrs) = $444.7M  
 
C. RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI) 
ROI is computed over a period of 13 year s as the base case and over 23 years as 
an excursion. The base case discount factor remains at 3% with an initial non-recurring 
investment of $13.7M for year one, $12.9M for  year two and $9.3M for  year three. The  
recurring investment cost is assum ed to be $1.8M every three years st arting at year four. 






Therefore, over a period of 13 years with a NPV savings of $263.1M and a NPV 
of investments of $39.7M our base case analysis of OB1 yields a ROI of 662.9%. Taking 
the analysis of OB1 out another 10 years to 23, using a NPV savings of $444.7M and a 
NPV of investments of $42.8M our base case analysis of OB1 yields a ROI of 1,038.7%. 




Base Case Annualized ROI (23yrs) = 1,038.7%
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From Figure 9, we can see OB1 c ash flow  over 23 years shows, that after the 
initial investment costs of developing OB1, we have a consistent positive return on cash 
flow. There is a sp ike every th ree years due,  primarily, to the larg e savings in n etwork 
infrastructure replacement. 
 
Figure 9.   OB1 Cash Flow Projection over 23 years ($0.0M Add’l NRI) 
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analyses  were conducted on thr ee key variables in the analysis : th e 
initial non-recurring investm ent am ount, th e recurring investm ent of OB1 after 
implementation, and the discount factors. Modifying one of th ese values at a tim e, while 
maintaining the others constant, provides a us eful analytical tool for understanding the  
financial behavior of the OB1 JCTD. 
1. Varying the Amount of Non-recurring Initial Investments 
The CENTCOM estimated initial investment costs for OB1 were $35.9M. Figures 
10 and 11 s how that by increasing the initia l non-recurring invest ment in OB1($39.7M) 
from $10.0M m ore, and $20.0M more respectively, we still have po sitive cash flows 
beginning in year f our. Figures 10  and 11 als o continue to show positiv e cash f lows 
throughout the life of OB1. Thus, we can say th at OB1 is a viable alternative to the 
current solution even if initial investment in OB1 is off by a factor of nearly two. 
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 Figure 10.   OB1 Cash Flow Projection over 23 years ($10.0M Add’l NRI) 
 
 
Figure 11.   OB1 Cash Flow Projection over 23 years ($20.0M Add’l NRI) 
A further analysis of OB1 can be s een in Figures 12 and 13. Figure 12 displays 
the NPV from the cash flows in Figure 10. Si milarly, Figure 13 shows the NPV from the 
cash flows in Figure 11. 
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 Figure 12.   OB1 NPV Savings over 13 years 
 
 
Figure 13.   OB1 NPV Savings over 23 years 
From the analysis of Figures 12 and 13 we can see that OB1 has a pos itive NPV 
Savings over 13 years, and 23 years, even if the initial investment cost for fielding OB1 is 
$10.0M or $20.0M more than originally budgeted ($35.9M) over three years. 
 43
The results of converting the NPV analyses above to ROI are shown in Figure 14. 
We see that as initial investment increases, ROI decreases. An overall positive ROI is still 
obtained given our worst case scenario ($20.0M investment over 23 years). 
 
Baseline value 
Figure 14.   Cumulative ROI (%) Sensitivity to Varying Investment Levels 
2. Sensitivity Analysis on Recurring Investment 
This paragraph addresses the sensitivity an alysis of OB1’s ROI to varying levels 
of recurring investm ent. Our base case an alysis of OB1 assum es a $1.8M recurring 
investment for OB1 over its life span. This  recurring investm ent comes from  network 
architecture upgrades, including, deskt op P Cs, m onitors, BC NICs, BC switches, 
upgraded cabling, software licenses and system certifications and/or re-certifications.  
In this sensitivity analysis, we com pute ROI for recurring in vestments in a range 
from -50% of our baseline value of $1.8M through 1000% of that value.  
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 Baseline value (0,0) 
Figure 15.   Cumulative ROI (%) Sensitivity to Varying Recurring Investment Levels 
From Figure 15, we can see that even if the recurring investment estimate is off as 
much as 1000% ($18.0 M vice $1.8 M recurring ) OB1 still has a positive ROI. Table 4 
below shows these same results in tabular format. 
 Recurring Investment 





1.8 0% 662.9 1038.7 
4.5 250% 533.3 780.2 
9.0 500% 394.1 540.4 
13.5 750% 306.3 405.8 
18.0 1000% 245.9 319.6 
S/A on R-I 
Table 4.   %ROI obtained over varying recurring investments. Assumes a 3% df and $0.0M 
Nonrecurring Investment 
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3. Varying % of Discount Factor 
Our base case analysis used a discount ra te on a 10-year Tr easury note of 3%. 
Thus, there is a lo t of potential for infla tion to weaken the f uture outlook of OB1. We  
analyzed OB1 ROI for discount rates of 3%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Baseline value 
Figure 16.   Cumulative ROI (%) Sensitivity to Varying Discount Rates 
Figure 16 shows that even if the discount rate increases, from 3% to 10%, OB1 is 
a robust solution. 
This BCA describ ed a detailed W BS, analysis of CENTCOM provided data and 
sensitivity analysis. The following chapter will summarize the results of this analysis. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This report presented an overview of the OB1 JCTD, the OB1 technology itself, 
comparative alternative technologies to OB1, a generic structur e to use as a guideline for  
performing BCAs, and the application of that generic BCA structure to the OB1 JCTD.  
The BCA com pared the current D oD m ilitary network archite cture ( “as-is”) to  
what could be achieved (“to-be”) with the OB1 technology. Life Cycle Costs consists of 
investment cost to develop OB1, as well as, the cost to  upgrade, adm inistrate and 
maintain it. 
The key results of the business case analysis are summarized as follows:  
A. OVERVIEW 
 The OB1 technology is not a new network topology. It is m erely 
modifying the existing network in a way that reduces the network 
footprint, streamlines the process of  network set-up and take-down, helps  
ease the burden of adding and removi ng users to/from  the network and, 
perhaps most important, provides m ore current and tim ely information to 
the warfighter.  
 This thesis does not in any way an alyze whether the OB1 technology is  
capable of  being built or if it  m eets DoD networking security 
requirements, especially, regarding classified information.  
B. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
A sample of the cost benefits achieved from  OB1 is contained in Table 5. As we  
can see from  the table OB1 has the potenti al for a savings of $2,656.1M over a 23-year 
life cycle of OB1. That is a 95.6% savings over the current architecture. 
As-Is ($M) OB1 ($M) Delta $ Delta %
Investments 1,294.7 48.7 1,246.1 96.2%
O&S 1,482.3 72.3 1,410.0 95.1%
Total 2,777.0 121.0 2,656.1 95.6%
LCCE (23yrs)
 
Table 5.   Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) for OB1 (23 years) 
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Table 6 shows NPV and ROI for our base case analysis assuming: 
 10 year life cycle for OB1 
 Discount factor of 3% 
 $35.9M initial non-recurring investment 




Table 6.   NPV and ROI for our base case analysis 
Using our base case scenario of a 1 0-year life span for OB1, a discount factor of 
3%, $35.9M initial non-recurring investment and a $1.8M recurring investment OB1 will 
yield a NPV of $263.1M and a ROI of 662.9%. 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 The base case annualized ROI never falls below 275.6% when the 
discount factor was varied from 3% to 10% 
 The base case annualized ROI does not  fall below 683.4% even when the  
initial investment cost to field OB1 is increased by $20.0M dollars 
 The base case annualized ROI does not fall below 231.7% even when 
varying the recurring investment costs from 0% to 1000% 
 OB1 yields a ROI of 49.9% even under a worst case scenario:  
o 10-year life of program 
o 10% discount factor 
o Additional non-recurring investment of $20.0M 
o 1000% ($18.0M) increase in recurring costs (O&S) 
D. RISK ANALYSIS 
 The real risk involved with OB1 is  the potential for it not to be able to 
perform as advertised. Specifically: 
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o Will OB1 be able to c onsolidate multiple ind ependent le vels of 
security (MILS) (i.e. , multiple networks NIPR, SIPR, JW ICS) 
onto one workstation 
o And if it is capable of  doing this, will it b e able to enf orce all the  
applicable DoD security require ments regarding the handling and 
separation of classified material 
E. BOTTOM LINE  
The analysis conducted in this thesis shows that OB1 is a financially viable and 
robust solution to the problem  of having m ultiple air gapp ed networks. OB1 provides a 
high return on investment over a wide range of  varying input factors and appears to be a 
worthwhile investment for the DoD. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The technology required in order to cons olidate m ultiple air gapped n etworks, 
while maintaining security via data separati on, is extremely technical and difficult to do. 
However, there are m any vendors and governm ent entities that have m ade significant 
strides in this area of research over the last couple of years.  
One area of future research is th e potenti al benefits that OB1 could bring to a 
command via improved knowledge m anagement (KM) and knowledge superiority (KS) 
practices. Another area to be researched could be the benefits of thin client com puting. 
OB1 has the ability to provide eithe r thin  client, thick client computing or any 
combination ther eof. Thin c lient co mputing by itself holds several advantages for an 
organization. These advantages combined with the added benefits of better KS/KM have 
the potential to m ake OB1, or any other si milar technology, extrem ely appealing to a  
command, organization and, ultimately, warfighter. 
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APPENDIX A 
The following data were obtained from the OB1 team and used extensively in this BCA. 
 
Workstation Reduction 
Current Network Total Users     
GCTF 13000     
MCFI 15000     
SIPR  35000     
NIPR 35000     
JWICS 4520     
    USCENTCOM   
Total Users   35000   
Total Workstations   102520   
Total workstations reduced   67520   
Average cost per workstation   $1,700   
Savings through reduction     $  114,784,000    
OB1 cost/user (Black Channel NIC and INTEGRITY PC)   $1,800   
Total Cost for Black Channel NIC and INTEGRITY PC    $ (63,000,000)    
        


























Network Equipment Reduction 
Current Network Total       
GCTF 271       
MCFI 313       
SIPR  729       
NIPR 729       
JWICS 94       
          
# workstations per switch   48     
Savings factor   34%     
Value of COTS switch    $  5,000      
          
Total switch savings All CENTCOM       $3.6M 
          
Black Channel (BC) Switch and Administration 
and Authority Workstations         
          
# of workstations/ BC switch - est workstations per 
subnet   225     
          
# of BC switches required CENTCOM   156     
Cost of Black Channel Switch    $  4,000      
Total Cost for BC Switches CENTCOM     $-0.6M   
          
# of BC Admin Workstations/User Workstation   500     
# of BC Admin Workstations required CENTCOM   70     
Administration Workstation Cost    $   10,000      
Total Cost BC Admin Workstations CENTCOM     $-0.7M   
          
# of Authority workstations required (est 1 primary & 1 
backup)    2     
Black Channel Authority Workstation Cost    $       250,000      
Cost of Black Channel Authority Workstations     $-0.5M   
          
Total BC Switches, Admin and Authority 
Workstations CENTCOM       $-1.8M 
          
Total Network equipment savings CENTCOM       $1.8M 











Network Admin Personnel Reduction 
Network Total       
GCTF 26       
MCFI 30       
SIPR  70       
NIPR 70       
JWICS 9       
         
# workstations/network admin personnel   500     
Loaded labor cost    $        130,000      
Savings factor matches % of reduced 
network hardware   34%     
Total network personnel savings 
CENTCOM   $   8,700,488  over 3 yrs $26.1M 
          
PC Admin/Maintenance Personnel Reduction 
Network Total       
GCTF 52       
MCFI 60       
SIPR  140       
NIPR 140       
JWICS 18       
          
# workstations/PC admin/maint personnel   250     
Loaded labor cost    $         110,000      
Savings factor - matches percentage of 
eliminated w/s   34%     
Total PC admin/maint personnel savings 
CENTCOM  $  15,396,996 over 3 yrs  $46.2M 
Total Personnel Saving CENTCOM       $72.3M 
 

















Base Operating Systems Costs 
Avg annual 
electricity/workstation  $            201  over 3 years $40.7M 
Avg annual air 
conditioning/workstation  $             92  over 3 years $18.6M 
Avg annual costs for 
space/workstation  $             50  over 3 years $10.1M 
Workstation wiring 
cost/workstation  $            100  cost/workstation - one time savings $6.8M 
BOS savings of all 
CENTCOM        $76.2M 
NOTE:  BOS does NOT include:   
 Lift/deployment costs 
 Type 1 Encryptor savings  
  
NOTE: Ambient Heat differential in desert AOR is greater than the Tampa factor used here  
  
Total savings reducing 
CENTCOM with OB1       $202.1M
 
APPENDIX B 
Projected initial non-recurring investment costs as reported by the OB1 team. 
 
 
Task / Item (cost in millions $) FY09 FY10 FY11 TOTAL
Operational
Operational Management 0.09$         0.09$        0.10$        0.28$           
OPS IPT support (CONOPS/TTP, Scenario Development) 0.10$         0.04$        0.04$        0.18$           
Assessment IPT Support 0.03$         0.06$        0.13$        0.22$           
Travel 0.03$         0.03$        0.03$        0.09$           
Assessment Organization Support 0.22$         0.24$        0.30$        0.76$           
Demonstration -$           0.32$        0.39$        0.71$           
Operational Total 0.47$         0.78$        0.99$        2.24$           
Technical
Technical Manager (incl travel, documentation, and training) 1.60$         2.70$        2.60$        6.90$           
Test and Evaluations: TD, LUA, and MUA 1.20$         1.00$        1.20$        3.40$           
Sofware & Hardware Integration, Configuration 2.40$         1.10$        1.10$        4.60$           
INTEGRITY PC + PCS SABI Certification 2.80$         2.30$        0.90$        6.00$           
INTEGRITY PC Robustness Certification 2.20$         1.70$        0.80$        4.70$           
PCS Robustness Certification 1.20$         1.20$        0.40$        2.80$           
PCS HW Switch Robustness Certification 1.60$         1.80$        0.60$        4.00$           
Technical Total 13.00$       11.80$      7.60$        32.40$          
Transition 
Transition Planning 0.20$         0.30$        0.70$        1.20$           
Travel 0.02$         0.02$        0.03$        0.07$           
Transition Total 0.22$         0.32$        0.73$        1.27$           
Grand TOTAL 13.69$       12.90$      9.32$        35.91$          
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